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Abstract: 
The Soviet – British treaty is very well known. It represents the end of a road that 
began  in  December  1941,  through  Anthony  Eden’s  visit  to  Moscow.  On  that 
occasion Stalin forwarded a project that, actually, divided the mutual domination 
in Europe and modified the frontiers. But the final treaty, signed on May 26, 
1942,  doesn’t  mention  anything  about  the  territorial  changes  discussed  in 
Moscow.  On  Berlin’s  instructions,  some  Swedish  journals  published  articles 
regarding the so-called „territorial clauses” which, in fact, don’t exist in the actual 
treaty. We consider these standpoints as an episode in a „war of nerves”, which 
caused significant damages to the Allied cause, at public opinion level.     
 
Rezumat: 
Tratatul  sovieto-britanic  din  1942  este  binecunoscut.  Acesta  este  finalul  unui 
traseu ce a început în decembrie 1941 prin vizita lui Anthony Eden la Moscova. 
Cu  acea  ocazie,  Stalin  a  înaintat  un  proiect care,  în  fapt,  împărţea  dominaţia 
comună în Europa şi modifica frontierele. Dar tratatul final, semnat la 26 mai 
1942,  nu  menţiona  nimic  cu  privire  la  schimbările  teritoriale  discutate  la 
Moscova. La ordinele Berlinului, câţiva ziarişti suedezi au publicat câteva articole 
privind aşa-numitele „clauze teritoriale” care, în realitate, nu existau în tratat. 
Considerăm publicarea acestor articole ca un episod în „războiul de nervi” care 
producea daune însemnate cauzei Aliaţilor la nivelul opiniei publice.  
 
Keywords: Swedish press, spheres of influence, media war, British – Soviet 
treaty 
 
I. Basic considerations. Subject motivation   
This  diplomatic  moment  has  been  very  intensely  analyzed  by 
historiography and, today, it is no more a gap to fill with regards to the 
substance of the pre-concluding talks and the treaty itself. This document 
means an end road for some negotiations, which were started in December 
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1941, with the visit of the chief of  the Foreign Office, Anthony Eden, in 
Moscow.  This  reunion  provoked  very  intense  academic  commentaries, 
especially related to the Soviet designs towards its Western boundaries and 
the future of Europe. A last contribution, known to us, that of the Russian 
historian, Oleg Rzheshevsky, published in 1995 in Bulletin of International 
Committee for Second World War History, seemed very useful to us, bringing 
into  academic  debate  unpublished  documents  from  the  Soviet  archives, 
including  treaty  and  secret  protocol  drafts  forwarded  by  Stalin  and  the 
main decisions adopted for finalising the treaty in its May 26 form. 
The  object  of  our  paper  is  the  way  in  which  the  Swedish  press 
analyzed the British – Soviet Treaty. Why Swedish? Because in the same 
journals  from  that  country  the  analyses  and  commentaries  around  this 
treaty superseded (to preview the conclusions) even the Moscow talks (as 
we will see below in these the pages) and they were insistently promoted. 
Our  selection  was  made  from  the  Romanian  diplomatic  reports  in  that 
country and these documents weren’t limited only to the national journals. 
At  the  same  time,  the  very  large  number  of  press  quotations  plays  an 
important role in the activity of informing and, why not, in the future peace 
initiatives of Romania. At that moment, however, press commentaries came 
to  strengthen  the  political  option  of  Romania,  which  explained  the 
frequently quotations thereout.      
Without claiming that this paper will offer new information about 
the inter-Allied relations during that period of time, we only wanted to 
bring  to  light  the  way  in  which  bilateral  negotiations  (in  our  case,  the 
British  –  Soviet  ones)  gave  rise  to  several  interpretations  (objective, 
subjective  or  even  totally  disproportioned  compared  to  the  actual 
significance of one or another of the diplomatic moments mentioned). Last 
but not least, our paper intended to underline, at least as a nuance, the 
importance of the political influence on press commentaries.  
 
II. Diplomatic background  
Starting with December 15, 1941, Anthony Eden was I. V. Stalin’s1 
special  guest  in Moscow.  Since  the  first meeting,  Stalin  proposed  to  the 
chief  of  the  Foreign  Office  two  treaty  projects:  one  for  mutual  military 
assistance and another for settling the post-war problems and stated that he 
wanted  an  agreement  (practical  arithmetic)  and  not  only  a  declaration 
                                                 
1  Llewellyn  E.  Woodward,  British  Foreign  Policy  in  the  Second  World  War  (London:  Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962), 191. War, diplomacy and media: the British–Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942 in Swedish press 
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(algebra)2. The second treaty has attached a secret protocol.  How does this 
draft look like?  Poland  was  to  be  enlarged  to  the  West  and  its  Eastern 
frontier should pass along the Niemen. Czechoslovakia would be restored to 
its  former  frontiers  including  Sudetenland.  Moreover,  the  territory  of 
Czechoslovakia was to be enlarged in the South at the expense of Hungary. 
The same restoration occurred in the case of Yugoslavia, which could be 
expanded at the expense of Italy (Trieste, Fiume, islands in the Adriatic 
Sea). Albania might be reconstituted as an independent State under other 
States’  guarantee  of  its  independence3.  Turkey  might  receive  the 
Dodecanese, a region in Bulgaria, South Burgas, populated by Turks, and, 
perhaps,  some  territories  in  Syria.  Bulgaria  would  be  punished  for  its 
behaviour during the war and ought to endure a small territorial loss on 
her Yugoslavian frontier and it would be absolutely sufficient for Bulgaria 
to have one sea port, respectively Varna.  
As for the Western states, Stalin expressed the possibility that Great 
Britain could have terrestrial and naval bases in France, Belgium, Holland, 
Norway, Denmark, with guarantees of ingress and egress to and from the 
Baltic  Sea  for  some  States4. Regarding Germany, Stalin appreciated as 
„absolutely  necessary”  to  separate  Rhineland  from  the  rest  of  Prussia 
(eventually  it  could  be  transformed  into  an  independent  state,  or 
protectorate,  which  could  be  discussed  later  on).  Bavaria  should  be, 
probably, an independent state and Austria should be reconstituted as an 
independent state5.    
At the end of the proposals, of course, time  had come for claims. 
Restoration of the Soviet frontiers before June 22, 1941, (the Soviet – Finnish in 
1940,  including  assignation  of  Petsamo  to  the  Soviet  Union,  the  Baltic 
republics, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the Soviet-Polish frontier as 
we mention above). The conclusion of a military alliance between Romania 
and the Soviet Union, with the latter’s right to have military, air and naval 
bases on the first one’s territory was taken into account. A similar „scheme” 
was also seen for Finland6.    
                                                 
2  Ibid. 
3  Oleg  Rzheshevsky,  „The  Grand  Alliance.  New  Documents  and  Commentaries”,  1945: 
Consequences and Sequels of the Second World War, Montreal, 18th International Congress of 
Historical Sciences Bulletin, no 27/28, (September 2), 19. 
4 Ibid., p. 20. 
5 Ibid., p. 21. 
6 Ibid. War, diplomacy and media: the British–Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942 in Swedish press 
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Regarding  Romania,  besides  all  the  aforementioned,  the 
„transferring”  of  the  Danube  Delta  to  the  Soviet  Union  „for  assuring 
security” was referred to7.     
The  protocol  means  virtually  a  redrawing  of  frontiers  and  an 
allotting of spheres of influence. The British Foreign Ministry answered 
that he could not sign such document without preliminary consultation 
with his colleagues. Stalin agreed with that point of view but he considered 
that the question of the Western frontier should be settled immediately8.    
Finally, on May 20, Eden submits to Molotov, in London, the Mutual 
Assistance Treaty, for twenty years, which didn’t mention anything about 
frontiers9. On May 24, Molotov cabled t o Moscow that the bilateral treaty 
was  „unacceptable  [...]  an  empty  declaration  of  which  the  Soviet  Union 
doesn’t need”10. On the same day, Molotov received surprising instructions 
from Stalin: „we have received the draft treaty Eden handed to you. We do 
not  consider  it  an  empty  declaration  and  acknowledge  that  it  is  an 
important document. It lacks the question of the security of frontiers, but 
this  is  not  bad,  perhaps,  for  this  gives  us  a  free  hand.  The  question  of 
frontiers,  or  to  be  more  exact,  of  the  guarantees  for  the  security  of  our 
frontiers at one or another section of our country, will be decided by force 
[...] It is desirable to sign the treaty and then fly to America”11. Finally, the 
treaty was signed on May 26; the first part thereof mentioned the mutual 
support  and  each  party’s  pledge  not  to  conclude  separate  peace.  The 
second part, which had to remain in force for twenty years, stipulated the 
basis  of  the  post-war  collaboration,  for  resistance  against  a  future 
aggression  and  for  post-war  reconstruction,  also.  Article  5  „takes  into 
consideration the United Nations’ interests”, both countries undertook to 
„act  according  to  the  principle  of  non  –  territorial  aggrandisement  for 
themselves and the non – intervention in the internal affairs principle”12. 
We could easily observe the Soviet Union important setback, during those 
five  months  which  followed  the  Anthony  Eden’s  visit  to  Moscow.  The 
waiting factor was taken into consideration. Stalin realised the importance 
of maintaining good relations with the United States and the importance of 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 24. 
8 Ibid., p. 22. 
9 Woodward, 195. 
10 Geoffrey Roberts, „Ideology, Calculation and Improvisation: Spheres of Influence and 
Soviet Foreign Policy 1939 – 1945”, Review of International Studies, 25 (1999): 664. 
11 Rzheshevsky, 26. 
12 Woodward, 196. War, diplomacy and media: the British–Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942 in Swedish press 
commentaries 
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non-entering  into  contradiction  with  the  principles  of  war  and  peace 
publicly stated by the United States’ policy makers.    
 
III. Press reaction 
In  the  June  12,  1942  issue  of  Helsingborgs  Dagblad  (pro-German, 
anticommunist  and  nationalistic  but  not  pro  –  Nazi)  an  article,  with  a 
significant  title,  was  inserted:  The  New  Holly  Alliance.  It  expressed  the 
„world’s  astonishment”  about  the  announcing  of  successive  visits  of 
Molotov  to  London  and  Washington13.  At  the  same  time,  there  was 
underlined the belief that „a character like Molotov did not travel so far, 
assuming so much risks if it wasn’t necessary for him to be in Washington 
and London. The presence of Mr. Maiski and Mr. Litvinov in London and 
Washington wasn’t sufficient for maintaining close relations between the 
Allies”14.   
The next lines of the article made major references to the content of 
the bilateral talks in London, concluded by the above mentioned treaty. 
According  to  the  Swedish  journal,  the  question  of  the second  front  was 
debated  and  both  parties  promised  that  neither  of  them  would  sign  a 
separate  peace  treaty.  The  Swedish  reader  was  reminded  that  a  similar 
pledge has been made before, during World War I,  yet it was not kept, 
under the very well known conditions. The article listed possible Soviet 
targets within the Baltic States re-annexation, as well as Karelia and Hangö 
Peninsula, or obtaining some military bases in Norway and Sweden; all of 
that  would  be  perceived  by  the  British  Government  as  conquests.  „But 
Eden avoided talking about these things”15.       
In its final part, the article we mentioned pointed to the treaty’s goal 
(assuring peace in Europe) without omitting, however, the declarations of 
Sir Stanford Cripps according to which it was, frankly speaking, a Soviet 
peace  and  not  a  British  one,  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  being 
interested in defending other parts of the world. The logic conclusion was 
that  „Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  [...]  cannot  avoid  the  Russian 
influence over all European people. Soviets are chosen by England to be the 
„Europe sword”, since France couldn’t do this anymore”16. And – in the 
opinion  of  the  Swedish  journal  –  “even  if  Molotov  abandoned  what  he 
himself called conquests, it must be reminded that there is something else 
                                                 
13 Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (A. M. A. E.), fond 71/1939, Al Doilea Război 
Mondial, vol. 160, Acorduri 1941 – 1943, f. 86. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., f. 87. 
16 Ibid. War, diplomacy and media: the British–Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942 in Swedish press 
commentaries 
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he could count on – the internal bolshevism”. In the end, straightforwardly 
and without any alternative, it was stated that „this is the case if Russians 
win”.  But  the  hope  still  remains:  “[…]  guns  haven’t  spoken  their  final 
word, yet”17. And, as the Swedish feelings towards one or another of the 
belligerents were very well known, it’s hard for us not to read  between 
these lines the hidden (more or less) wish regarding the winner of the war. 
In this respect, we can bring forward one example only. On August 10, 
1944, the United States’ Ambassador in London, John G. Winant, sent a 
record of his conversation with his Swedish colleague, Hägglöf. According 
to the latter, the Swedish Government didn’t have any intention to follow 
the Turkish example by totally ending the commercial relations „at the last 
moment, when the Germany imminent defeat is absolutely sure”18. Over 
one  day  only,  the  United  States’  Ambassador  to  Sweden  (Johnson) 
described, in a diplomatic message, a meeting with a Swedish high official 
who stated that „now, when the issue of the war with Germany is drawing 
near to a settlement, to hurt the bleeding animal is totally repugnant to the 
Swedish thinking. He personally cannot help but feel ashamed if Sweden 
would give a blow to the German dying war machine in the name of some 
material benefits. The Swedish Government would never agree to make its 
country a second <<Turkey>>”19. 
Turning back to the press commentaries, the article quoted above is 
not even close the end of the media debate. The June 23 issue of Göteborgs 
Morgen Posten (pro – Nazi) published (according to a commentary of the 
Romanian Legation in Stockholm) “the secret clauses of the Soviet – British 
Pact”20.  This  was  based  on  „information  received  from  the  diplomatic 
representative  of  an  Allies  friendly  country  and  it  created  much  stir  in 
Sweden”21.    
But what did, according to the Swedish journal, the Soviet – British 
treaty  stipulate?  The  recognition  „on  principle”  of  the  „Soviet  views 
regarding its own security and its strategic frontiers with Finland, the Baltic 
States and Romania” was one of the points. Moreover, Finland, parts of 
Northern Scandinavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1944, vol. IV, Europe (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 602. 
19 Ibid., 607. 
20 A. M. A. E., fond 71/1939, Al Doilea Război Mondial, vol. 160, Acorduri 1941 – 1943, f. 
112. 
21 Ibid. War, diplomacy and media: the British–Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942 in Swedish press 
commentaries 
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„were recognised as a part of the Russian sphere of influence”22. The Soviet 
Union also received the right to have bases and garrisons „for preventing 
future attacks of the Axis Powers”. A supplementary clause to the third 
article gave Moscow the possibility to exert political and military control in 
Finland, Germany, Romania and Bulgaria „in agreement with England”23. 
Furthermore, on the same occasion, an understanding regarding Iran was 
reached24.           
As we  can easily see, press commentaries exceed by far – maybe 
deliberately – the terms of the Stalin – Eden’s talks in December 1941, as 
well as the treaty in May 1942, which does not include any references to 
frontiers, territories, spheres of influence. And it didn’t include any kind of 
secret  clauses.  Could  we  talk,  in  that  case,  about  a  tentative  of 
„intoxication”, from Germany, in order to paint the Allied efforts in very 
dark colours and to consolidate the will of some Axis allies to fight against 
the Bolshevik danger? As showed before, it was stated that the source of 
information  was  not  German  or  Finnish25.  To  the end of th e article the 
reliability of that source was underlined again; although the paper declared 
itself aware of the “impression which could be provoked upon Sweden and 
upon  the  whole  world”26,  the  lack  of  doubt  about  this  information  was 
decisive in taking the decision of publishing it without hesitation, “even 
risking criticism in our country and abroad”27.  
The media „fire” started by the Göteborgs Morgen Posten spread very 
fast.  On  June  23,  the  Aftonbladet  (pro  –  Nazi)  was  headlined:  The  secret 
clauses  of  the  Russian  pact.  Northern  Scandinavia  in  the  Russian  sphere  of 
interests. Sensational declarations in GMP over Moscow – London gamble28.  In 
addition to Göteborgs Morgen Posten, these clauses included also a guarantee 
for the Soviet Union regarding the freedom of navigation from the Baltic 
Sea to the Black Sea and from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.     
As expected, the Swedish press commentaries weren’t left without 
reaction. On June 25, Göteborgs Morgen Posten hosted an official reply of 
Reuters. On this occasion, the information published by the Swedish journal 
was appreciated as “German propaganda […] 100% false”29. This reply was 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., f. 83. 
26 Ibid., f. 112. 
27 Ibid., f. 83. 
28 Ibid., f. 84. 
29 Ibid., f. 81. War, diplomacy and media: the British–Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942 in Swedish press 
commentaries 
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inserted together with those five points of the Soviet – British treaty and a 
reference  to  Anthony  Eden’s  declaration,  on  June  4,  in  the  House  of 
Commons.  According  to  that  “all  the  clauses  included  in  the  British  – 
Soviet agreement will be published in a White Book. There are no secret 
clauses,  or  conditions  or  commitments  from  any  part”30.  Moreover,  a 
declaration, in the same spirit of Veaceslav Molotov, was recalled by his 
British colleague on the same occasion. On the same page with the Reuters 
reply, Göteborgs Morgen Posten added that “we have our information from a 
source which is in on the same side with Reuters. Of course, we could not 
give names because this would lead to our correspondents’ compromising. 
Information come from a source not connected with the Germans or their 
Allies  and  it  is  not  propaganda  for  we  have  no  interest  in  publishing 
propagandistic  information.  We  published  this  article  […]  without  any 
doubt  regarding  its  authenticity”31.  As  we  may  notice,  the  trust  in  the 
source’s validity was reaffirmed, much more virulently.         
The Swedish press didn’t hesitate to quote some reactions from the 
Axis countries, as for example Romania, to emphasize the serious nature of 
the disclosures that have been made. In Dagsposten (journal of the Swedish 
National Association, a pro-Nazi political group, supported by Berlin) on 
June 27, 1942, under the title Bucharest: Military bases for Russians means the 
same thing as a Russian invasion it was stated that „Romanian journals prove 
the  profound  impression  made  in  all  countries  by  the  Swedish  journal 
disclosures  regarding  the  British  –  Soviet  Entente.  The  press  holds 
unanimous in appreciating that the Romanian policy is more justified than 
ever”32.  Quoting  Universul,  (which,  in  its  turn,  referred  to  the  supposed 
territorial secret clauses and to the spheres of influence settled in London), 
it was underlined that „what is extraordinary is the fact that Great Britain 
could sign an agreement by which it abandoned Europe, where, a couple of 
years earlier, it enjoyed influence and prestige”33.   
 
IV. Conclusions 
From the diplomatic standpoint we could talk about an important 
moment in the process of building the Great Alliance (the treaty between 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the end of the negotiations started in 
December 1941, in Moscow) and, from the media point of view, about a 
                                                 
30 Ibid., f. 82. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., f. 85. 
33 Ibid. War, diplomacy and media: the British–Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942 in Swedish press 
commentaries 
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spectacular moment, referring to what the press (the Swedish one) found 
(or was informed) about this treaty.   
The Swedish press (some of the journals that were available to us) 
was  divided  between  a  pro-German  attitude  (Helsingborgs  Dagblad)  and 
even  a  pro-Nazi  standpoint  (Aftonbladet,  Göteborgs  Morgen  Posten, 
Dagsposten).  The  so-called  secret  clauses  of  the  May  26  treaty  were 
presented with many details which exceed –and we stressed that aspect 
once again – even the negotiations from Moscow, in December 1941. It is 
obvious that, despite all given assurances , regarding the sources’ complete 
impartiality  ,  those  Swedish  journals  interpreted  the  British  –  Soviet 
negotiations as a sharing of the continent, giving the public opinion details 
which could damage the war effort of the United Nations, at least at the 
perception level. In other words, it was a type of media war, but, at that 
point of the research, we could not state, beyond any doubt, (except for the 
case of Dagsposten) whether this moment has been operated by Berlin or 
whether  it  has  been  a  personal  option  of  the  aforementioned  journals, 
based on the sympathy for Germany.  
We cannot conclude without bringing special thanks to Mr. Pär 
Nilsson, Senior Librarian at the Department of Collections, Newspapers 
and Ephemera from the National Library of Sweden, who offered us 
significant information about the political orientation of the quoted 
Swedish journals. 
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